The data showed in this review exposes basic aspects that define organic foods and some factors that influence consumption by the population, ie, its production in the country and the motivations for the consumption of food produced in this system. This way of production, originated in the early decades in the 20th century, nowadays involves environmental, social and health aspects. Although the environment is a more evident aspect than other ones, economic output and potential beneficial to health are discussed further (...) in this description about organic foods. Brazil, has excelled in the growth of this type of farming, however holds the 6th position in the world and 2nd producer in Latin America, with grains and vegetables being the main products, although the livestock reaches the largest area. The consumption of these products is primarily motivated by the perception of organic food as healthier than other kinds of food. However, there are no conclusive studies about better nutritional value, where nutrient concentrations are often unchanged. In contrast the presence of more phytochemicals compounds and reduced pesticides’ content in vegetables, and lipid profile in animal products can justify the health benefits of the products obtained from the organic production system. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el (...) amor es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. ABSTRACT The article inquires into the attentionality inherent to love as a privileged and primordial experience of care. Seeking access to the phenomenon of love, we suggest inquiring into it according to the type of attention it promotes, drawing on and discussing the resources provided by Husserlian phenomenology, as well as by counter-intentional phenomenologies, particularly Waldenfels'. Thus, while it is necessary to account for the affective grounds of attention in order to describe this phenomenon, it is also essential to recognize that love is experienced as an original fact or as an event that entails an existential and attentional reorientation of the lover. (shrink)

Jessica Flanigan defends patients' rights of self-medication on the grounds that same moral reasons against medical paternalism in clinical contexts are also reasons against paternalistic pharmaceutical policies, including prohibitive approval processes and prescription requirements.

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

In this note we describe a discussive set theory which is related to a certain modal set theory as discussive propositional logic is related to the system S5 of Lewis.

Considerando que a fundação do Middle Group é uma dissidência teórica do pensamento psicanalítico clássico, destaco as idéias centrais dos teóricos britânicos das relações de objeto, mostrando os pontos de divergência entre eles e Klein, autora que, apesar de pioneira no desenvolvimento do conceito de relações objetais, apresentava-se como principal representante do pensamento tradicional. Em seguida, analiso a noção winnicottiana de constituição de um si-mesmo e de conquista do concernimento como os fundamentos teóricos que marcam a originalidade de Winnicott no (...) que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento da teoria psicanalítica e ao Middle Group. Isso é feito com base na idéia de que, para Winnicott, a constituição de um si-mesmo pessoal é a condição primordial para a conquista da capacidade de relacionar-se com e a conquista do concernimento, a condição para que capacidades como ter confiança em, ter liberdade pessoal e interpessoal, ser responsável por sejam alcançadas.Based on the concept that the foundation of the Middle Group of British is a theoretical dissidence of the classic psychoanalytic propositions, I emphasizes the central ideas of the British theorists of the object relations theory, showing their disagreements with Klein, author who, although was a pioneer in the development of the object relations concept, was the main defender of the traditional thinking. After that, I analyze the winnicottian notions of self constitution and achievement of concern as well as the theoretical pillars which distinguish Winnicott originality with regard to the development of the psychoanalytic theory and in respect to the Middle Group. I do that based on the idea that, for Winnicott, the constitution of a sense of self is the main condition to the achievement of the ability to enter in relationship with and the achievement of concern, a condition necessary for the acquisition of abilities such as to trust in, to have personal and interpersonal freedom, to be responsible for. (shrink)

I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that occasion. (...) Accounts of non-reductive realization conforming to this condition are implementing what I call 'the powers-based subset strategy'. I focus on the crucial case involving mental and brain states; the results may be generalized, as appropriate. I first situate and motivate the strategy by attention to the problem of mental causation; I make the case, in schematic terms, that implementation of the strategy makes room (contra Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, and elsewhere) for mental states to be ontologically and causally autonomous from their realizing physical states, without inducing problematic causal overdetermination, and compatible with both Physicalism and Non-reduction; and I show that several contemporary accounts of non-reductive realization (in terms of functional realization, parthood, and the determinable/determinate relation) are plausibly seen as implementing the strategy. As I also show, implementation of the powers-based strategy does not require endorsement of any particular accounts of either properties or causation---indeed, a categoricalist contingentist Humean can implement the strategy. The schematic location of the strategy in the space of available responses to the problem of mental (more generally, higher-level) causation, as well as the fact that the schema may be metaphysically instantiated, strongly suggests that the strategy is, appropriately generalized and instantiated, sufficient and moreover necessary for non-reductive realization. I go on to defend the sufficiency and necessity claims against a variety of objections, considering, along the way, how the powers-based subset strategy fares against competing accounts of purportedly non-reductive realization in terms of supervenience, token identity, and constitution. (shrink)

Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence (...) of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence---'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. Each schema imposes a condition on the powers of entities taken to be emergent: Strong emergence requires that higher-level features have more token powers than their dependence base features, whereas Weak emergence requires that higher-level features have a proper subset of the token powers of their dependence base features. Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically neutral, primarily reflecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers commonly suppose that any fundamental entities there may be are maximally determinate. More generally, they commonly suppose that, whether or not there are fundamental entities, any determinable entities there may be are grounded in, hence less fundamental than, more determinate entities. So, for example, Armstrong takes the physical objects constituting the presumed fundamental base to be “determinate in all respects” (1961, 59), and Lewis takes the properties characterizing things “completely and without redundancy” to be “highly specific” (1986, 60). (...) Here I look at the usually cited reasons for these suppositions as directed against the case of determinable properties, in particular, and argue that none is compelling (Sections 1 to 3). The discussion in Section 3 moreover identifies positive reason for taking some determinable properties to be part of a fundamental (or relatively fundamental) base. I close (Section 4) by noting certain questions arising from the possibility of fundamental determinables, as directions for future research. (shrink)

Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.

O presente trabalho propõe-se analisar a importância das propostas winnicottianas de intervenção às pessoas com deficiências. Depois de refletir sobre a intervenção, apresentada pelo autor a partir de suas experiências como pediatra, observando bebês e suas mães, e como psicanalista, no atendimento dos "casos fronteiriços", foram analisados três aspectos: o uso desses conceitos para a compreensão do desenvolvimento de pessoas com deficiência, sua relevância no entendimento da maior intensidade de riscos a que estão expostos e a pertinência dos pressupostos da (...) clínica do amadurecimento com esses indivíduos. Algumas vinhetas de um caso são utilizadas para exemplificar o uso da teoria de Winnicott na compreensão do cliente e da técnica utilizada.The purpose of this text is to analyze the importance of winnicottian concepts of intervention with disabled persons. After reflecting on the concepts proposed by the author, based on his pediatric experiences, observing babies and their mothers, and as psychoanalyst, attending borderline cases, three aspects have been analyzed: the application of these concepts with regard to understanding the development of disabled persons, their relevance to the understanding of the intensive risk to which individuals are exposed and the pertinence of the proposals of the maturation clinic near these individuals. Some case vignettes were utilized as examples of applications, as well as techniques. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim, em seu As Formas Elementares da Vida Religiosa, cita como o pilar da filosofia e da religião budista as Quatro Nobres Verdades – um referencial teórico que permeia o desenvolvimento de todas as principais tradições de pensamento budistas. Neste artigo, nosso objetivo é apresentar linhas gerais e introdutórias sobre esse conceito tendo como linha narrativa o texto de Durkheim – trazendo, também, discussões sobre os contextos onde Durkheim escreveu e contrapondo outras abordagens teóricas.

O budismo é a quarta maior religião do mundo, reunindo cerca de meio bilhão de seguidores. No Brasil, por outro lado, esta religião representa uma parcela muito pequena da população, cerca de apenas 0,13%, num total de 245 mil budistas. Contudo existe uma ilusão de que há um crescimento do budismo no Brasil, pois tem ocorrido um despertar pela indústria do bem-estar, em especial em meditações mindfullness, workshops e imersões de meditações, páginas de jornais e revistas tratam sobre este assunto. (...) Mas este despertar pelo orientalismo não se reflete no número de seguidores do budismo no Brasil. Se compararmos o crescimento do budismo ao longo do CENSO com o crescimento da população brasileira no mesmo período, veremos que o budismo não cresceu na mesma proporção, o que representa um decréscimo na proporção da população do número de adeptos. Para compor o presente ensaio foi realizada revisão bibliográfica, análise dos dados históricos do CENSO e análise crítica da situação. (shrink)

Tradução do texto originalmente intitulado "Dissertation sur la politique des Romains dans la religion", de Charles-Louis de Secondat, barão de La Brède e de Montesquieu. Trata-se de trabalho apresentado no dia 18 de junho de 1716 à Academie Royale des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Bordeaux e somente publicado após a sua morte.

O texto traz uma discussão sobre Educação, Artes e Saberes Ancestrais como aportes importantes para o combate ao racismo. Utilizamos teorias estruturadas no Movimento Negro, de Mulheres Negras no viés Cultural, Político, Estético, Religioso e nos pilares dos Saberes Ancestrais africanos em diásporas. Partimos da reflexão das interações socioculturais e escolares mediante uma práxis dialógica entre Educação, Arte e Saberes Ancestrais, discorrendo sobre o corpo do negro como discurso no mundo e a afetividade como uma tecnologia humana no processo de (...) pertencimento e reconhecimento histórico e social para a reconexão da memória do povo africano em diáspora. (shrink)

Vaccine refusal harms and risks harming innocent bystanders. People are not entitled to harm innocents or to impose deadly risks on others, so in these cases there is nothing to be said for the right to refuse vaccination. Compulsory vaccination is therefore justified because non-vaccination can rightly be prohibited, just as other kinds of harmful and risky conduct are rightly prohibited. I develop an analogy to random gunfire to illustrate this point. Vaccine refusal, I argue, is morally similar to firing (...) a weapon into the air and endangering innocent bystanders. By re-framing vaccine refusal as harmful and reckless conduct my aim is to shift the focus of the vaccine debate from non-vaccinators’ religious and refusal rights to everyone else’s rights against being infected with contagious illnesses. Religious freedom and rights of informed consent do not entitle non-vaccinators to harm innocent bystanders, and so coercive vaccination requirements are permissible for the sake of the potential victims of the anti-vaccine movement. (shrink)

(Note: this is the lead article in a forthcoming issue of _Australasian Philosophical Review_ edited by Dana Goswick, with invited comments by Karen Bennett, Ricki Bliss, Jonathan Schaffer, Alexander Skiles. In June 2024 there will be an open call for other commentators; please contact Dana or Jessica if you are interested.) A wide range of scientific, religious/cosmological, and philosophical views presuppose that there is what I call `metaphysical structure', whereby (i) some goings-on in a given domain D are (absolutely (...) or comparatively) fundamental; and (ii) (comparatively) non-fundamental goings-on in D metaphysically depend on (absolutely or comparatively) fundamental goings-on in D. Such presuppositions motivate two broadly metametaphysical questions: (i) what makes it the case that some goings-on in a domain D are (absolutely or comparatively) fundamental? and (ii) what makes it the case that (comparatively) non-fundamental goings-on in a domain D metaphysically depend on (absolutely or comparatively) fundamental goings-on in D? Here I advance my preferred 'Fundamentality First' package deal approach to metaphysical structure, which couples a primitivist approach to fundamentality with a pluralist approach to metaphysical dependence. (shrink)

Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual (...) or philosophical reasons to reject this straightforward interpretation. Contrary to widespread opinion, Aristotle does not characterize Phronesis as supplying ends. Instead, its ethical import lies wholly in its ability to “determine the mean“. Moreover, because character involves non-rational cognition of the end as good, Aristotle can restrict practical intellect to deliberation without abandoning his anti-Humean view that we desire our ends because we find them good. (shrink)

Note: this is the first published presentation and defense of the 'proper subset strategy' for making sense of non-reductive physicalism or the associated notion of realization; this is sometimes, inaccurately, called "Shoemaker's subset strategy"; if people could either call it the 'subset strategy' or better yet, add my name to the mix I would appreciate it. Horgan claims that physicalism requires "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that Horgan's (...) account fails to rule out physically unacceptable emergence. I rather suggest that this and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by requiring that each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. I go on to show that a wide variety of physicalist accounts, both reductive and non-reductive, are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem. In particular, non-reductive physicalism accounts typically appeal to a relation plausibly ensuring that the powers of a higher-level property are a proper subset of those of its physical base property. (shrink)

Knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. In this collection of new essays on knowledge ascriptions, world class philosophers offer novel approaches to this long standing topic.

The physicalist thesis that all entities are nothing over and above physical entities is often interpreted as appealing to a supervenience-based account of "nothing over and aboveness”, where, schematically, the A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The main approaches to filling in this schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that the (...) resulting formulation of physicalism is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable. (shrink)

This text slightly modified, became the first chapter of our M.A. thesis - The Tropical Phoenix: a critical note about dualism and the theory of dependency, presented to the "Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas" of the University of São Paulo. The main themes of this thesis are: I - "Philosophy of History", Marxism and "objectivity"; II - Brazilian social thinking: the theories of/about development and the apologetic Marxism: 1.º Werner Baer: conservative "objectivity" against the reformist "passions"; 2.º Carlos (...) Lessa: Industrialization as "decision"; 3.º ISEB: reformist objectivity against socialist passions; 4.º Political maturity against socialist adventures; III - Common presuppositions.Este texto veio a constituir, modificado, o primeiro capítulo de nossa tese de mestrado - A Fênix tropical: nota crítica sobre o dualismo e a teoria da dependência, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo. Trata dos seguintes temas: I - A "filosofia da história", o marxismo e a "objetividade"; II - O pensamento social brasileiro: as teorias do/sobre o desenvolvimento e o marxismo apologético: 1.º Werner Baer: a "objetividade" conservadora contra as "paixões" reformistas; 2.º Carlos Lessa: Industrialização como "decisão"; 3.º ISEB: objetividade reformista contra paixões socialistas; 4.º Maturidade política contra aventuras socialistas; III - Os pressupostos comuns. (shrink)

This article engages with the discussion between Rawls and Habermas concerning the interplay of political realism and normativity to address a fundamental question in contemporary political philosophy. How realistic is a normative theory of politics that critiques or rejects many deep religious, philosophical, and metaphysical commitments? Rawls contends that political theory achieves realism and objectivity by avoiding pronouncements on metaphysical theories (non-metaphysical). In contrast, Habermas argues that realism emerges when grappling with metaphysical theories and prioritizing praxis over metaphysics (post-metaphysical). The (...) article critically examines Rawls’s objections to metaphysical content, lack of practical interest, and the instability of the foundations of Habermas’s democratic theory. By addressing these objections, it advocates for the greater political realism of the post-metaphysical normative approach. (shrink)

Some claim that Non- reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom (...) needed to characterize certain special science entities, and those needed to characterize their composing physical entities; these correspond to what I call ‘reductions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘eliminations’ in degrees of freedom. I then argue that eliminations in degrees of freedom, in particular—when strictly fewer degrees of freedom are required to characterize certain special science entities than are required to characterize their composing physical entities—provide a basis for making sense of how certain special science entities can be both physically acceptable and ontologically irreducible to physical entities. (shrink)

Pretende-se com este artigo demonstrar que a Darstellung, em seu uso técnico, concerne, sobretudo, às objetidades da Vontade, mas também à sua autonegação. No contexto da “metafísica da vontade”, torna-se fundamental ao vocabulário schopenhaueriano estabelecer um correlato necessário da Vorstellung, especialmente quando se consolida a demonstração da complementaridade de Real e Ideal. Em síntese, a Darstellung consiste no termo pelo qual se aponta para a livre apresentação da coisa em si, conteúdo real daquilo que nos aparece determinado pelo intelecto.

Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.

It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine (...) distinctions among a variety of relevant notions of propriety which our intuitions may reflect. These notions variously apply to the agent herself, her character traits, her beliefs, her reasoning and any resultant action. Given the delicacy of these issues, I argue that the knowledge norm is not a fixed point from which to defend substantive and controversial views in epistemology. Rather, these views need to be defended on other grounds. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers accept Hume's Dictum, according to which there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed entities. Tacit in Lewis 's work is a potential motivation for HD, according to which one should accept HD as presupposed by the best account of the range of metaphysical possibilities---namely, a combinatorial account, applied to spatiotemporal fundamentalia. Here I elucidate and assess this Ludovician motivation for HD. After refining HD and surveying its key, recurrent role in Lewis ’s work, I (...) present Lewis ’s appeal to HD as providing a broadly axiomatic generating basis for the space of metaphysical modality, and canvas the prima facie advantages of the resulting combinatorial principle---HD ---as being principled, extensionally adequate and modally reductive. Most criticisms of Lewis 's combinatorialism have targeted seeming ways in which the theory overgenerates the desired space; I rather argue that HD seriously undergenerates the desired space in three different ways. For each way I argue that available means of overcoming the undergeneration either fail to close the gap, undermine the claim that HD is a principled generator of metaphysical modal space, undermine the reductive status of Lewis 's combinatorialism, or call into question the truth of HD. (shrink)

Seat belt mandates seem like a paradigmatic case of justified paternalism. Even those who generally object to paternalism often concede that seat belt laws are justified. Against this near-consensus in favor of mandates, I argue that seat belt laws are unjust and public officials should not enforce them. The most plausible exceptions to a principle of anti-paternalism do not justify seat belt mandates. Some argue that seat belt mandates are not paternalistic because unbelted riders are not fully autonomous. Others claim (...) that the decision to ride unbelted harms other people. Yet these attempts to defend seat belt mandates on non-paternalistic grounds cannot overcome the case against seat belt mandates. I therefore conclude that even seat belt mandates are unjust. With this comprehensive case against seat belt mandates, I demonstrate the more general difficulties in justifying any form of coercive paternalism. (shrink)

O texto desenvolve o argumento que comparar, na perspectiva do materialismo dialético, requer que o pesquisador faça o movimento do concreto ao concreto pensado segundo as leis da dialética, situando o objeto no tempo, no espaço, na particularidade e no geral, nas semelhanças, diferenças e não descartando as contradições. Pelo contrário: colocando as contradições em evidência para elucidar os interesses materiais (mundo do trabalho) e ideológicos (nível da linguagem).

Este artigo tem por objetivo apresentar as concepções de alegria, graça e felicidade nas obras de Clément Rosset.

O Rio de Janeiro colonial e escravista é um contraste à ideia de cidade maravilhosa. Apesar do esforço atual de inserir o quesito “maravilha” na região portuária, foi por ela que milhares de africanos destinados a escravização chegaram. O texto reflete sobre o Cais do Valongo e o cemitério dos pretos novos, tratando-os como locais de memória do tráfico e dos descendentes de africanos escravizados. Os diferentes usos públicos e políticos feitos desses locais também serão tratados uma vez que tem (...) recebido diferentes atenções por parte das esferas pública e privada, e também internacional, como a UNESCO. A área teve sua memória constantemente trabalhada desde o Império tendo na República dois momentos: Pereira Passos e a grande remodelação da cidade no início do século XX e recentemente diante das obras de revitalização do Porto. Palavras-chaves: Valongo, africanos, memória. (shrink)

Nota sobre publicações recentes que revelam aspectos pouco conhecidos da biblioteca de Newton – os numerosos textos religiosos, místicos e herméticos. Os biógrafos de Newton resistiram muito até admitir que os escritos esotéricos fossem genuíno interesse do sábio e que tivessem importância para entender sua trajetória intelectual. As publicações aqui indicadas afirmam o contrário, seguindo trilha aberta por ensaio pioneiro de J. M. Keynes (1946).